- Clamping down on domestic spending won't tame the deficit, but it will harm exactly the kinds of government services Americans support and count on. A backlash will eventually come, either from dissatisfied citizens who care about responsive government or from financial markets that care about fiscal sanity. Or both.
Well, they're half right. The half about harming government services, that is. The rest requires that swing voters -- the ones who aren't already essentially committed to one party or another -- connect the government services that they support and count on with, well, the government. Unfortunately, this much blogged report on what it's like to talk to swing voters suggests that we can't take that for granted:
- The worse things got in Iraq, the better things got for
Bush. Liberal commentators, and even many conservative ones, assumed,
not unreasonably, that the awful situation in Iraq would prove to be
the president's undoing. But I found that the very severity and
intractability of the Iraq disaster helped Bush because it induced a
kind of fatalism about the possibility of progress. Time after time,
undecided voters would agree vociferously with every single critique I
offered of Bush's Iraq policy, but conclude that it really didn't
matter who was elected, since neither candidate would have any chance
of making things better. Yeah, but what's Kerry gonna do? voters would
ask me, and when I told them Kerry would bring in allies they would
wave their hands and smile with condescension, as if that answer was
impossibly nave. C'mon, they'd say, you don't really
think that's going to work, do you?
To be sure, maybe they simply thought Kerry's promise to bring in allies was a lame idea--after all, many well-informed observers did. But I became convinced that there was something else at play here, because undecided voters extended the same logic to other seemingly intractable problems, like the deficit or health care. On these issues, too, undecideds recognized the severity of the situation--but precisely because they understood the severity, they were inclined to be skeptical of Kerry's ability to fix things. Undecided voters, as everyone knows, have a deep skepticism about the ability of politicians to keep their promises and solve problems. So the staggering incompetence and irresponsibility of the Bush administration and the demonstrably poor state of world affairs seemed to serve not as indictments of Bush in particular, but rather of politicians in general. Kerry, by mere dint of being on the ballot, was somehow tainted by Bush's failures as badly as Bush was.
As a result, undecideds seemed oddly unwilling to hold the president accountable for his previous actions, focusing instead on the practical issue of who would have a better chance of success in the future. Because undecideds seemed uninterested in assessing responsibility for the past, Bush suffered no penalty for having made things so bad; and because undecideds were focused on, but cynical about, the future, the worse things appeared, the less inclined they were to believe that problems could be fixed--thereby nullifying the backbone of Kerry's case.
In fact, talk of political "issues" was a bit of a mystery to them:
- More often than not, when I asked undecided voters what issues they would pay attention to as they made up their minds I was met with a blank stare, as if I'd just asked them to name their favorite prime number.
- In this context, Bush's victory, particularly on the strength of those voters who listed "values" as their number one issue, makes perfect sense. Kerry ran a campaign that was about politics: He parsed the world into political categories and offered political solutions. Bush did this too, but it wasn't the main thrust of his campaign. Instead, the president ran on broad themes, like "character" and "morals." Everyone feels an immediate and intuitive expertise on morals and values--we all know what's right and wrong. But how can undecided voters evaluate a candidate on issues if they don't even grasp what issues are?