Several
bloggers
are pointing to a
rather
scary column by Robert Novak, a man not ordinarily thought of as a
left-wing softie, which describes Rumsfeld's war planning as based on
a best-case scenario --- specifically, that native Iraqi Shiites will
do most of the fighting, and that the Republican guard won't put up
any stiff resistance. This, in turn, is based on advice from a small
circle which includes the likes of Richard Perle and that
noted problem solver at the level of civilizations, Newt Gingrich, but
does not seem to include many, if any, of his own military's generals.
When asked about the US contingency plan for a credible
worst-case scenario --- hard fighting in urban areas, with loyal Iraqi
troops deliberately using large civilian populations as human shields
--- Novak's sources, both in the Senate and high in the Pentagon,
say they're not sure it even exists.
Rumsfeld apparently expects the Iraqis to welcome Americans as
liberators, as in Afghanistan. Of course, there are just a few
differences from the Afghan scenario. Like the bombs we've been
continually dropping on Iraq for, oh, the last ten years or so. And
the domestic privation which Saddam Hussein's government is blaming,
fairly or not, on the American-driven sanctions regime. And the nature
of our putative Shiite allies, who are likely to remember in a pinch
that their Iranian coreligionists have backed them consistently, while
the United States left them in the lurch after the Gulf War. When
Saul Landau reports
- The last day in Baghdad . A woman with dyed blond hair and
tight pants runs a shop. She tells me she has just returned from a
vacation with her Algerian live-in boyfriend to Barbados and
Martinique and "I could hardly wait to return home. I love it here."
I ask her how she will respond if war comes. She shrugs. "I am
Christian," she declares, "and I love my president because he is
strong and protects us. Without a strong president like him, we would
be persecuted. All of Iraq would be chaos, disorder. I stand with him
against Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, Bin-Laden and George Bush." Her
Algerian boyfriend grins in agreement.
...I'm not sure her views are representative --- it's hard to tell
for many reasons, not the least of which is government minders on the
trip --- but it's equally hard to be sure they aren't. (The line
about bin Laden bears a little explanation --- Iraqis remember that in
the Gulf War, Osama bin Laden offered to manage a Saudi campaign
against Iraq, even if the Americans, who Saudi royalty called in
instead, do not).
Meanwhile, back on the home front, the Novak column is just the
latest in a fairly long series of hints that the American military is
not working hard to figure out how bad a worst-case scenario could
get, or preparing itself as well as it might. We've had the
persistent reports from unnamed sources that intelligence analysts are
under heavy pressure to suppress
evidence that an invasion might be unexpectedly prolonged, or even
unnecessary. We've had the rigged war game. And,
prefiguring the Novak column, we've had the Newsweek article
which wound up by describing Rumsfeld's battle planning:
- In a scene that has repeated itself more than once,
Rumsfeld, an impatient questioner, demands to see a plan of
attack. The generals respond that they can't plan without knowing
exactly what they are planning for and with what tools, i.e., what
bases and what forces. Rumsfeld becomes vexed and insists on "out of
the box" thinking. The generals look perplexed or exasperated and fall
back on traditional notions of the American way of war, which is to
overwhelm the enemy with superior firepower. Such a campaign takes a
long wind-up and a massive attack, which prompts the basic
questions --- from where? with what forces? --- all over again.
It's not the first time that the generals have come under that kind
of pressure from the White House. William Burton points
out that General Schwarzkopf came under pressure from the
administration during the first Gulf War to attack without the chance
to adequately prepare. He resisted the pressure and got his forces in
place, with generally satisfactory results... offering no thanks at
all to the administration officials who compared him to General
McLellan in the Civil War. (He doesn't name the "high official" who
made that comparison, but he makes a note, some twenty pages later, of
an "inspirational" gift from Cheney --- tapes of Ken Burns' Civil War
series).
But it's not as if Cheney and Rumsfeld are just Bush I retreads
trying to redo the Gulf War. It's important to remember they're older
than that. They are, in fact, Nixon administration retreads trying to
redo Vietnam --- a war where technical superiority and early large
set-piece victories (the lonesome cry of the cold war hawk: "The Tet
offensive was a military defeat for the Viet Cong!") didn't
exactly prefigure success...
Of course, you could try to write off
the
dissatisfied noises from the Pentagon as disinformation. Then again,
the point of disinformation is to deceive the enemy about the nature of
your preparations. Which means that if the Novak column, say, is
disinformation, then the American military actually wants
to fight an urban battle, and is trying to gull Saddam into fighting one by making him believe it is ill prepared for that. I'll leave it as an exercise to the reader to
figure out why the Pentagon might want to be thrown into that
particular briar patch...